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JURISDICTION BY TRICKERY: ENTICEMENT FOR
SERVICE OF PROCESS
IN ORDER to induce a defendant to enter a jurisdiction and thereby sub-
ject his person to.the process of its courts, a plaintiff may well be temptedto resort to underhanded means.1 The universally stated rule, however,
is that service of process, thus procured, is vulnerable to attack, and it
will be set aside upon proper application.2 This relief is accorded not
because the circumstances surrounding the service have deprived the
court of jurisdiction, but rather because the court will not sanction, even
inferentially, such abuse or degradation of its process." Application
1 Commercial Mutual Accident Co. v. Davis, 213 U.S. 245 (19o9) ; Fitgerald Con-
struction Co. v. Fitzgerald, 137 U.S. 98 (189o); Williams ads. Reed, 29 N.J.L. 385
(862). See In re Cash, 383 Ill. 409, 50 N.E.zd 487 (1943); Miller v. Acme Feed
Inc., 228 Iowa 861, 293 N.W. 637 (1940) ; Neotex Mfg. Co. v. Eidinger, 25o App.
Div. 504, 294 N.Y. Supp. 767 (1937); Shillman v. Toulson, 211 App. Div. 336,
207 N.Y. Supp. 296 (x926); Bernstein v. Hakim, 126 Misc. 582, 214 N.Y. Supp. 82
(1926); Van Donselaar v. Jones, 195 Iowa io8i, 192 N.W. 22 (1923); Saveland
v.. Connors, 121 Wis. 28, 98 N.W. 933 (1904); Abercrombie v. Abercrombie, 64 Kan.
29, 67 Pac. 539 (1902); Pilcher v. Graham, 9 Ohio Dec. 825 (1899); Toof v. Foley,
87 Iowa 8, 54 N.W. 59 (1893); Heston v. Heston, 56 N.J.L. 235, 28 At. 8 (1893);
Van Horn v. Great Western Mfg. Co., 37 Kan. 523, 15 Pac. 562 (1887) ; Havener v.
Heist, 9 Phila. 274 (County Ct., Pa. 1873); Dunlap & Co. v. Cody, 31 Iowa 260
(1871) ; Marsh's Admr. v. Bast, 29 N.J.L. 385 (1862). These are but a few of the
cases which have dealt with the problem. Of the thirty-two jurisdictioni which have,
a few have done so in the situation where fraud is used to obtain jurisdiction over
defendant's property. Presumably, however, the court would reach the same result in
a personal jurisdiction situation. See for example, Guardian Management Corp. v.
Huffman, Mun. Ct. App. for D.C., 61 A.zd 472 (1948); Oklahoma Industrial Finance
Corp. v. Wallace, 18o Okla. 363, 69 P. 2d 362 (1937); Abel v. Smith, 151 Va. 568,
144 S. E. 616 (19±8); Siro v. American Express Co., 99 Conn. 95, 121 At. 280
(1923); Sessoms Grocery Co. v. International Sugar Feed Co., 188 Ala. 232, 66 So.
479 (1914); Deyo v. Jennison, 1o Allen 410 (Mass. 1865); Timmons v. Garrison,
28 Tenn. 147 (1843). Jurisdiction thus obtained is not usually exercised. Jurisdiction
Over Persons Brought Into a State by Force or Fraud, 39 YALE L.J. 889 (1930);
STUMBERO, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 71 (1937); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 78.4 ( 3 d ed. 1949).
2RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § is, comment b (1942); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT
OF LAWvS § 78, comment d (1934); BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 78.4 (1935).
" See Commercial Mutual Acc. Co. v. Davis, 213 U.S. 245 (19o9) ; Taylor v. Mc-
Cool, 183 Tenn. I, 189 S.W.±d 817 (194S)- Nicholson v. Gulf, Mobile & Northern
R. Co., 177 Miss. 844, 172 So. 3o6 (1937); Battelle v. Youngstown Rolling Mill Co.,
84 Tenn. 355 (x886); Gregory v. Howell, xis Iowa z6, 91 N.W. 778 (19o); RE-
STATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 78, comment d (1934). See also cases cited note 2
supra.
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of this rule in all but the most stereotyped situations, however, has con-
fronted the courts with many difficulties.
Illustrative is the recent case of Tickle v. Barton.4  There, the non-
resident defendant had duly objected to his service in the action pursuant
to West Virginia's nonresident motorist statute.5 While a ruling in this
matter was pending, the plaintiff, representing himself as a spokesman
for a banquet committee, invited the defendant to attend a dinner within
the jurisdiction. When the defendant, having accepted the invitation,
appeared, he was served with process personally. The Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia, affirming the court below, vacated this
service. Two judges dissented, however, observing that while the rule
applied by the majority was a salutary one, the inferences that could
reasonably be drawn from the facts of the instant case did not bring it
within the "influence" of that rule.6
This divergence of judicial opinion echoes, to some extent, similar
conflicts in other jurisdictions,7 and indicates a reappraisal of those
'95 S.E.2d 427 (W.Va. 1956).
Defendant objected by a plea in abatement and issue was joined on this plea.
'Tickle v. Barton, 95 S. E. 2d 427, 433 (W.Va. x9s6).
7On the one hand are the cases in which the court has found a'trick but refused to
exercise its jurisdiction. Those cases include situations where plaintiff's agent performs
the trick, Goss v. Hall, ,z5 Ind. App. 75, 117 N.E.2d 649 (1952)5 Empire Mfg. Co.
v. Ginsburg, 253 Ill. App. 242 (1929); Carpenter v. Spooner, 2 Sandf. 717 (N.Y.
x850) plaintiff's friend performs the trick as a favor to plaintiff and informs plaintiff
where and when defendant can be found, Blandin v. Ostrander, 239 Fed. 700 (ad Cir.
1917) ; plaintiff forges a special invitation to the defendant, Steiger v. Bonn, 4 Fed. 17
(C.C.D.N.J. 188o). See also Wanzer v. Bright, 52 Ill. 35 (1869). Plaintiff takes
advantage of defendant's suggestion that defendant come to plaintiff's jurisdiction,
Ultcht v. Ultcht, iz6 Atl. 44o (N.J. Ch. 19±4) ; plaintiff conspires to make a resident
the agent of a non-resident defendant, Frawley, Band & Wilcox v. Pennsylvania Casualty
Co., 124 Fed. 259 (C.C.M.D. Pa. 1903); plaintiff conspires with one defendant
in order to get others, Nicholson v. Gulf, Mobile & Northern R. Co., 177 Miss. 844,
172 So. 306 (1937) ; Taylor v. McCool, x83 Tenn. i, 159 S.W.zd 817 (1945); plain-
tiff arranges to have a deposition taken in his jurisdiction in order to get jurisdiction
of defendant's person, Peel v. January, 35 Ark. 331 (188o). Compare Bowes v. Su-
perior Ct. of Alameda County, 124 P.2d 667 (Cal. App. 1942 ) ; plaintiff begins attach-
ment proceedings causing defendant to make a general appearance, Economy Electric Co.
v. Automatic Electric Power & Light Plant, i85 N.C. 534, 118 S.E. 3 (1923). Com-
pare Copas v. Anglo-American Provision Co., 73 Mich. 541, 42 N.W. 69o (.889);
plaintiff and defendant agree to trial without jury. When defendant appears, accord-
ing to the terms of the agreement, plaintiff serves him with process and demands jury
trial, Graves v. Graham, i9 Misc. 618, 44 N.Y. Supp. 415 (1897) ; plaintiff keeps a box
of summons on hand for delinquent debtors who have been requested to meet with
plaintff for purpose of settlement, Baker v. Wales, 3 Jones & Sp. 403 (N.Y. 1873);
plaintiff uses the criminal processes to obtain civil service and/or plaintiff's friends ac-
commodate plaintiff by bringing defendant within the desired jurisdiction, Tuggle v.
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factors, articulated and otherwise, which govern decisions in this context.
A survey of the cases reveals that courts have generally been content
to be guided by the results of a somewhat mechanically applied "fraud
test" instead of inquiring into the degree of acceptability of the ques-
tioned conduct.8  Accordingly, a defendant need but establish the exist-
ence of the technical elements of fraud .to persuade the court to decline
jurisdiction. In brief, this would entail proof that the defendant had
been "induced"" to enter the jurisdiction by the misrepresentations of
Sutton, 260 Ky. 304, 84 S.W.2d 1017 (1935); Bowman v. Neblett, 24 S.W.2d 697
(Mo. App. 1930). See also Klaiber v. Frank, 9 NJ. x, 86 A.zd 679 (952); Town
of Hainden v. Collins, 85 Conn. 327, 82 AUt. 636 (i912); Byler v. Jones, 79 Mo. 261
(x883); McNab v. Bennett, 66 Ill. 157 (1872); Blair v. Turtle, S Fed. 394
(C.C.D.Neb. iS8); Rutledge v. Krauss, 73 N.J.L. 397, 63 Atl. 988 (x9o6);
Towsend v. Smith, 47 Wis. 623, 3 N.W. 439 (1879); Williams v. Bacon, io Wend.
636 (N.Y. 1832); Wells v. Gurney, 8 Barns & C. 769, io8 Eng. Rep. 1229 (K.B.
x828).
On the other hand are cases in which the court has failed to find sufficient trickery
to enable it to exercise jurisdiction.- Included in this group of cases are situations where
defendant's presence is the result of an invitation extended by several persons including
an employee of plaintiff, Ex parte Taylor, 29 R.I. 129, 69 Adt. 553 (19o8) ; plaintiff
asks her former husband to come to see their child and subsequently serves him with
process, Guzzetta v. Guzzetta, 137 N.E.2d 419 (Ohio x956) ; plaintiff decides to sue
defendant after defendant has started into plaintiff's jurisdiction at the request of
plaintiff, Crandall v. Trowbridge, 170 Iowa 155, 15o N.W. 669 (x915); plaintiff takes
advantage of defendant's presence caused by an attempted settlement instigated by a
third person, Union Sugar Refinery v. Mathieson, 24 Fed. Cas. 682, No. 14 398
(C.C.D. Mass. 1864) ; plaintiff takes advantage of defendant's suggestion that defendant
come iito plaintiff's jurisdiction, Lingo v. Reichenbach Land Co., 225 Iowa 1 12, 279
N.W. 121 (x938) ; plaintiff persuades defendant to come for talks and serves him upon
arrival, Watkins v. North American Land & Timber Co., 2o T.L.R. 534 (1904);
plaintiff uses a director's meeting for the sole purpose of obtaining jurisdiction, Na-
tional Paper Corp. v. Scheek, 47 Lack. Jur. x89 (County Ct., Pa. 1946); trustees'
meeting, lams v. Tedlock, x1o Kan. 510, 204. Pac. 537 (1922); plaintiff assures de-
fendant that a suit will be brought in one state and serves him in another, McLain v.
Parker, 88 Kan. 717, 129 Pac. 1140 (1913) ; defendant yields to a request by plaintiff
that he defend his property in an attachment proceeding begun for the sole purpose of
gaining personal jurisdiction, Duringer v. Moschino, 93 Ind. 495 (1883); plaintiff
causes a deposition to be taken which defendant attends, Jaster v. Currie, 198 U.S. 144
(1905).
* See generally the cases cited infra, notes 9-12, which are typical examples of this
narrow approach.
* See Schwartz v. Artcraft Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc., xo F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1940)
Cavanagh v. Manhattan Transit Co., 133 Fed. 8i8 (C.C.D.NJ. x9o5); Strong v.
Strong, 299 P.zd 148 (Okla. 1956); Gampel v. Gampel, 114 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1952);
Stephens v. Thomasson, 63 Ariz. 187, 16o P.2d 338 (94s); Margos v. Moroudas,
184 Md. 362, 40 A.2d 8x6 (1945), noted in 10 MD. L. REV. 80 (1949); Voltz v.
Tutt, 12 Ky. L. Rep. 506 ( 89o).
the plaintiff or someone in privity 0 with him. This burden would not
be sustained, however, if the defendant had entered of his own volition,"
nor if the plaintiff had not intended 12 to beguile the defendant. The
determination of these issues, thus, obviously involves complex evi-
dentiary problems concerning the intent of the parties, a difficulty which
may well explain the apparent lack of judicial uniformity in this area.
By narrowly limiting their consideration to the presence or absence
of the technical elements of fraud, the courts may, moreover, often
effectively lend sanction to conduct at least as reprehensible 3 as that
10 "To invalidate process lawful in form because the defendant is not a resident of
the jurisdiction of the court, it must appear that he has been brought into the jurisdiction
by fraud to which the plaintiff was privy. . . Any more stringent rule would require
a plaintiff, before causing service of a writ upon defendant whom he finds within the
jurisdiction, to inquire how he came there ..... .To impose such a burden upon a
suitor seems to us unreasonable." Ex parte Taylor, 29 R.I. 129, 132, 69 Atl. 553, 554
(1908). In Steiger v. Bonn, 4 Fed. 17, 19 (C.C.D.N.J. it8o) the court said, "The
only question is whether the facts shown are sufficient to identify the plaintiff with, and
hold him responsible for, the deception and fraud used to lure the defendant into
the state." And in Blandin v. Ostrander, 239 Fed. 700 (ad Cir. x97) it was said
that it is enough that the representations were "... by one acting in his [plaintiff's]
behalf."
"In Strong v. Strong, 299 P.2d 148 (1956), the decisive question was whether
plaintiff's invitation was the inducement or whether defendant came out of a parental
desire to see his children. If the latter could be proved, the court would exercise its
jurisdiction. Similarly, in Voltz v. Tutt, t2 Ky. L. Rep. 5o6 (189o), the vital dis-
tinction was whether defendant came in response to plaintiff's message or whether
he came on business of his own.
" This is best explained in Guzzetta v. Guzzetta, 137 N.B.2d 419, 421 (Ohio
1956): "To vitiate the personal service of summons upon a person in a foreign juris-
diction who is in the jurisdiction in response to an invitation extended to him by a party
to the action, an intent to trick and deceive him into coming for such purpose must
have existed in the mind of the sender and the invitation itself must have been a part
of the device or artifice employed to get the defendant into the foreign jurisdiction for
the purpose of serving him with summons." Similar rationale is found in Suhay v.
Whiting, 96 N.E.2d 609 (Ohio Coin. P1. 195o ) ; Taylor v. McCool, 183 Tenn. i, i89
S.W.2d 817 (1945) 5 and in Columbia Placers Co. v. Bucyrus Steam Shovel and Dredge
Co., 6o Minn. 142, 145, 62 N.W. 1S5, x6 (1895) the court said the "good faith"
of the plaintiff is the key factor. But cf. Jaster v. Currie, 198 U.S. 144, 148 (1905),
wherein the court said "He [plaintiff] arbitrarily could unite the two acts [i.e., the
deposition and service of process] and do the first because he hoped it would give him
a chance to do the last." Watkins v. North American Land and Timber Co., 2o T.L.R.
534 (1904).
It is a universally accepted rule that the plaintiff's good faith will be presumed until
the contrary is proved "to the satisfaction of the mind." Guzzetta v. Guzzetta, supra
at 421; and similarly, Crandall v. Trowbridge, 170 Iowa x55, 15o N.W. 669 (.9-5);
Kelly v. Citizens Farmers National Bank of Chickasha, 174 Okla. 1380, 50 P.2d 734
(93s).
" See cases cited note 7 supra. (Those wherein no fraud or trick was found.) And
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interdicted by strict application of their formal test. Thus, the courts
may countenance the otherwise fraudulent conduct of the plaintiff which
has the barest color of bona fides.' 4 Similarly, the courts may find no
fraud where the plaintiff has conspired with a defendant other than the
complaining defendant, 5 or where the defendant's presence has been
procured by "lawful means."'" Furthermore, if the defendant remains
in the jurisdiction beyond a "reasonable" period of time, the fraud which
initially induced his entry may no longer be viewed as the proximate
cause of his presence.' 7 And if the defendant should have known of
see Atlantic & Pacific Telegraph Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., x4 Jones & Sp. 377
(N.Y. i88o); Gumperz v. Hofman, 245 App. Div. 622, 283 N.Y. Supp. 823 (1935),
noted in 49 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1936), 20 MINN. L. REv. 686 (1936)1 Ex parte
Sellars, 25o Ala. 84, 33 So.2d 349 (1948) wherein the defendant was already within
plaintiff's jurisdiction and the fraud was designed to cause defendant to come to another
part of the same jurisdiction or to remain there long enough to be served. The courts
explain their approval of this fraud by saying there is no inducement from one juris.
diction to another as required by the "fraud test" and second, that defendant has a
duty to make himself available for service.
" See Watkins v. North American Land & Timber Co., 2o T.L.R. 534, 536 (1904).
Generally, however, performance will not vitiate the trickery. Cavanagh v. Man-
hattan Transit Co., 133 Fed. 8x8 (C.C.D.N.J. 19o5); Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Mary-
land v. Bussa, 207 La. 1042, 22 So.2d 562 (1945) ; Ultcht v. Ultcht, 126 Atl. 440 (Ct.
of N.J.Ch. 1924); Peel v. January, 35 Ark. 331 (1880).
" See Knoxville Bank & Trust Co. v. Mershon, 153 Ky. 169, 174, 153 S.W. 238,
241 (1913), in which the court said, "If he [defendant] had a right to go there
[into plaintiff's jurisdiction] on pleasure, knowing the process would be served, can
it make any difference that he went for the purpose of being served? And if not, can
it make any difference that there was an agreement beforehand .. 2. that they do this?
"In National Paper Corp. v. Scheek, 47 Lack Jur. 189, 193 (County Ct., Pa.
1946), a case that permitted the use of a director's meeting by the plaintiffs to obtain
jurisdiction of the defendant, the court said: "However the locating of the meeting
here was legal. It was undoubtedly a dirty trick and with a motive far from whole-
some. But we cannot see where it amounts to fraud, or misrepresentation or artifice. The
motive behind the meeting here did not render it illegal." See also lams v. Tedlock,
z1o Kan. 510, 204 Pac. 537 (1922); and and in Jaster v. Currie, x98 U.S. 144, 148
(19o5), the case on which the preceding cases rely, the court said that the case was no
exception to the general rule that doing an act lawful in itself (taking a deposition)
as a means of doing another act (service of process) lawful in itself cannot make a
wrong by the combination; and notice how the court sanctioned an obvious sham in
Duringer v. Moschino, 93 Ind. 495 (1883), where the plaintiff began attachment pro-
ceedings, requested defendant to defend, and when the defendant complied, service was
made upon him.
"? This test is a logical counterpart to the general rule in that since the defendant
cannot be served when induced into plaintiff's jurisdiction by trickery or fraud, there
must be a time ifter which the trickery will no longer be a defense. Otherwise a
defendant would remain immune from service for a particular cause of action forever.
The "unreasonable time" test is set forth in Olean St. Ry. Co. v. Fairmount Const. Co.,
55"App. Div. 292, 67 N.Y. Supp. 165 (1900). See also Klaiber v. Frank, 9 NJ. I,
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the danger, the plaintiff's wiles in luring him into the jurisdiction may
not constitute a valid defense.' 8
To resolve the doubts and cure the possible inequities inherent in
the operation of the general rule, therefore, it is submitted that the
courts must adopt one of two alternatives. First, if a court decides as
a matter of policy to condition its entertainment of cases on the method
in which jurisdiction was obtained, such determinations should turn on
the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case, and not on a rote
formula. This procedure would not only more effectively deter ques-
tionable conduct, but would also confine judicial attention to matters that
have little or no relation to the jurisdictional problem. 9
A second and more far-reaching alternative would require the court,
having found reprehensible conduct by a plaintiff in obtaining juris-
diction in a particular case, further to inquire whether or not injustice
would result if that jurisdiction were to be exercised. Factors which
might enter this determination would be the convenience of the forum
with regard to the immediate parties, the proximity of witnesses, and the
availability of evidence. In addition, it might be necessary to consider
whether the assumption of jurisdiction would frustrate such sound
86 A.2d 679 (195z)i Kelly v. Citizens Farmers National Bank of Chickasha, i74
Okla. 1380, 5o P.zd 734 (935) Suhay v. Whiting, 96 N.E.2d 609 (Ohio Com. P1.
1950).
"I1n Allen v. Betterly, 328 App. Div. 907, x6 N.Y.S.2d 39 (x939) the court
listed those considerations which are determinative of whether the defendant should have
been "aware" that there was a likelihood of service upon him. The same con-
sideration appears to be important in other decisions: Suhay v. Whiting, 96 N.E.2d 6og
(Ohio Com. P1. 195o); lams v. Tedlock, ixo Kan. 51o, zo5 Pac. 537 (1922). See
also Crandall v. Trowbridge, 170 Iowa i55, i5o N.W. 669, 673 (1915), in which the
court spoke of the fact that defendant could have sent someone else in his stead. But
cf. the cases of Garabettian v. Garabettian, zo6 App. Div. 5o2, 201 N.Y. Supp. 548
(1923), and Hill v. Goodrich, 3z Conn. 588 (1858), in which the defendant responded
to mysterious and anonymous invitations which would arouse suspicion in most people,
but yet this factor seemed not to affect the court's determination.
"D Such a rule would be based upon a standard of behavior capable of more liberal
application than the "fraud test." It would be consonant with this dicta found in
Olean St. Ry. Co. v. Fairmount Const. Co., 55 App. Div. 292, 67 N.Y. Supp. x65, 167
(9oo): "[T]he plaintiff ought not to be permitted to take advantage of a course of
conduct which, if not amounting to actual fraud and deceit, was certaintly equivalent
thereto, for it involved a breach of the confidence which King (defendant) had reposed
in the bona fides of the invitation of plaintiff's president to place himself within
the jurisdiction of the court." And yet the rule would go further in that it would
not be limited to situations where the plaintiff invites the defendant into plaintiff's juris-
diction. It would apply in any case where the court feels the defendant is a victim of
unscrupulous behavior on the .part of the plaintiff.
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policies as that which favors the amicable settlment of disputes," or that
which protects an individual's statutory rights to be sued in a particular
venue.21  This procedure would shift judicial attention from questions
of the plaintiff's misconduct to those bearing more directly on the juris-
dictional problem.
Adoption of either of these suggested alternatives would posit de-
cisions in this area on a more rational and supportable basis.
" Thus far a few courts have so reasoned. In State ex rel. Ellan v. Dist. Ct., 97
Mont. 16o, 170, 172, 33 P.2d 526, 530, 531 (1934) the court said, "The law favors
the compromise and settlement of disputed claims and should protect a non-resident who
comes into this state at the solicitation of his adversary for the purpose of attempting
such a disposition of a controversy, to the same extent as when one comes here as a
party to, or witness in, a case in court. ... A bona fide attempt to compromise and
settle a controversy without the trouble and expense of the institution of a suit and the
trial of a cause in a more important step in connection with the cause than argument of
a demurrer or the taking of a deposition for the preservation of testimony and the
general rule as to immunity should be extended to cases wherein, as here, a party to
a controversy has been induced for this purpose to come within rifle range, as it were,
under a flag of truce; honor and fair dealing should dictate that such a person be
permitted a reasonable time within hich to return to safety of the position from which
he was induced to withdraw, before his adversary goes into action." Similarly, see
Kelly v. Citizens Farmers National Bank of Chickasha, 174 Okla. 1380, 50 P.2d 734
(x935). But cf. Union Sugar Refinery v. Mathieson, a Cliff. 304, 24 Fed. Cas. 681
(C.C.D. Mass. 3864) where the sole purpose of defendant's presence in plaintiff's juris-
diction was to obtain a settlement and yet the court permitted service and exercised its
jurisdiction.
' See Nicholson v. Gulf, Mobile & Northern R. Co., 177 Miss. 854, 72 So. 306, 309
(1937) wherein the court said, "The right of a defendant to be sued- in the venue
fixed by statute is too valuable to permit it to be destroyed at the whim or will, or
for the convenience of the plaintiff. . . . A lawful act does not become unlawful
merely because it may be done by agreement between two parties (Here plaintiff and one
of several defendants conspired to get the others.) ; but if the purpose and result of the
act is to defeat and des troy a right guaranteed by law to another the act become, fraud-
ulent in its nature." See also Taylor v McCool, 183 Tenn., i, x89 S.W.zd 817, 8a2
(z945) in which the right protected -as the right to be sued in a certain county.
